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To what extent have improvements in level or eligibility of disability benefits acted as 
disincentives for employment? A systematic review of evidence from countries with well-
developed welfare systems.  
Ben Barr, Stephen Clayton, Margaret Whitehead, Karsten Thielen, Bo Burström, Lotta Nylen, Espen 
Dahl 
Introduction 
Dramatic rises in the number of people claiming disability benefits in several OECD countries over 
recent decades have lead to concerns about the social and economic exclusion of disabled people 
and the costs of income support for these groups [1-5]. Evidence from the UK and Sweden indicates 
a social gradient in the employment of chronically ill and disabled people, with employment rates 
declining with declining socioeconomic status [6-7]. Worklessness increases the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion which may further damage health and exacerbate health inequalities.  
One aim of disability policy is to provide adequate income security to people with a health condition 
or impairment when they are too illunable to work. Economists have long debated the effects of 
welfare programmes, with some arguing  that the level of provision of income security benefits 
themselves acts as a disincentive to labour force participation [8].  Several  authors in the US have 
concluded that the increase in the availability of disability benefits is responsible for most of the 
decline in labour force participation amongst older men in that countrythe US [9-11]. These 
econometric studies have, however, been criticised for inaccurately estimating the disincentive 
effects of disability benefits [12-15].  
The empirical evidence that does exist to supportsupports the hypothesis that disability benefits are 
major disincentives for work largely comes from studies in the United States (US)comes largely from 
studies in the US. , but it would be unsound to generalise from the US context to countries with 
more  extensive welfare systems.  Compared to more extensive welfare systems, however, The 
consequences for disabled people of not being employed are very different in the US where there 
are fewer safety nets, no universal health care system, and employer-provided health insurance is 
often provided through an employer andthat is lost when a person loses that employment.   Thus, it 
is would be unwise to generalise to other welfare systems from the US experience. This paper aims 
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to There is a need to synthesise the evidence on the question of employment disincentives in the 
context of advanced welfare systems, which is the aim of this paper.   
We conducted a systematic review of the evidence from 5 countries with well-developed welfare 
and universal healthcare systems to answer the following review question: “To what extent do the 
generosity or eligibility requirements of disability benefit programmes affect labour market 
participation?” These countries have implemented numerous policies over the past 30 years to alter 
benefit generosity and eligibility (see Appendix 1), providing an opportunity to exploit these natural 
policy experiments. More recently, policy makers in these countries have begun to experiment with 
reducing the generosity and narrowing the eligibility criteria for these benefits, on the assumption 
that this will increase the employment of people with chronic illness and disabilities. This strategy 
underpins the introduction of the Employment Support Allowance in the UK in 2008, the 2008 
reforms of the Swedish Sickness Insurance System, the 2003 reforms of disability benefits in 
Denmark and the 2004 disability benefit reforms in Norway [3-5, 16].  Whilst there has been a 
traditional review assessing the factors that have contributed to recent increases in disability 
benefits recipients in the UK [17], to our knowledge this is the first systematic review to address this 
issue and to take into account the relevance of the welfare system context.  
Methods 
Through our search and selection strategy we sought to identify all empirical studies from Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK that addressed the research question given above. We 
restricted our review to studies from these countries as they have sufficiently similar social welfare 
systems and policy contexts for cross-country policy learning to be relevant.  
Searches 
We searched 13 databases (Appendix 2) from 1970 to October 2008.  In addition grey literature 
searches were conducted on 12 relevant governmental and non-governmental organisational web 
sites (Appendix 2). This included a supplemental search at the Library of the University of 
Copenhagen. A comprehensive list of linked search terms was used, with terms associated with the 
policy, the population and the outcome (Appendix 3). Websites were searched using a search engine 
which allowed for  site specific searches with multiple search terms linked with Boolean commands 
[18].   
Selection 
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The searches identified 3077 potentially relevant studies. Following selection using the inclusion 
criteria in Table 1 and validity assessment detailed in Appendix 2, a total of 16 studies were included 
in the final review (figure 1). 
We defined disability benefits as, “state supported income replacement benefits paid to individuals 
out of the labour market for over 3 months due to health problems or disabilities”. We therefore 
excluded studies that primarily investigated the effect of economic incentives on short term sickness 
absence.  We also excluded studies which did not investigate the effect of disability benefit 
programmes on movement into or out of the labour market, e.g. those that only analysed 
movement between different benefit schemes. We defined eligibility requirements as any criteria or 
procedures the applicant needs to meet, or undergo in order to be eligible for disability benefits.   
Table 1. Criteria used to select studies for data collection and validity assessment 
Study Design.  All quantitative study designs.   
Participants/ population:  Working age (16-69) people or a subset of this population in Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden or the UK, from 1970 to the 2008 
Intervention. Changes to, or differences in, the generosity and/or eligibility requirements of 
disability benefits.  
Outcome measures: 
-Effect on the probability of being in employment and/or being on disability benefits.  
-Length of time on disability benefits.  
-length of time off work or not in employment.   
 
The lead reviewer excluded papers that were considered irrelevant, based on their titles and 
abstracts. The remaining studies were then evaluated separately by two reviewers against the 
inclusion criteria and validity assessment. A standardised form was used to collect data on the key 
characteristics of each study and carry out the validity assessment. Where results of multiple models 
are given in the papers reviewed, the results of the fullest or final model are presented here.   
Validity Assessment 
Econometric studies were the only study type identified through this review.  There are no standard 
tools available for the appraisal of econometric studies[19]. After consultation with an expert in 
synthesis of econometric studies (N.Rice, York University), a simple quality appraisal framework was 
developed using core epidemiological principles for assessing validity (Appendix 2) [20-22].  
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A total of 28 studies underwent validity assessment, of which 12 were excluded by the process [23-
33]. The excluded studies had adopted a similar strategy to that criticised by Bound (1989). Whilst 
they used regression models to compare the labour force participation of those with different 
disability benefit levels, the difference in disability benefit levels were due to the application of the 
benefit rules rather than a change in those rules resulting from policy decisions.  The variation in 
benefit levels in these studies was therefore determined to a large part by other factors such as age, 
level of disability, prior earnings or number of dependants, each of which would have a direct 
independent effect on labour market participation. Bound (1989, 1991) argues that this analytical 
strategy significantly overestimates the impact of disability benefits on labour market 
attachment[13, 15] 
 
Results 
Sixteen studies were included from 4 countries: 8 from Canada, 5 from the UK, 2 from Sweden and 
one from Norway.  No studies from Denmark met the inclusion criteria.  The studies included 
investigated both changes in benefit generosity and eligibility criteria (see Table 2). The main 
findings are presented for each country separately to take into consideration the country policy and 
labour market context.   
 
Table 2: TThe typologyes of policy changes investigated by studies included in the reviewevaluated 
by studies included in the review  
Type of policy changes investigated Number of studies  
Differences in benefit generosity only 9 [34-42] 
Changed eligibility requirements only 3 [43-45] 
Both changes in eligibility requirements and benefit generosity 
as separate parameters in the same model 
2 [34, 46] 
Policy change that included a combination of changes to 
eligibility requirements and benefit generosity 
2 [47-48] 
 
Studies investigating Canadian policy changes 
Seven of the eight studies from Canada assessed the impact of changes in the Canadian/ Quebec  
Pension Plan (CPP/ QPP) [34-35, 37, 43-44, 46, 49], and one study investigated the impact of 
variations in benefits from various sources [36] (see Table 2).   The majority of studies (6/8) 
investigated effects on men only and most only reported on people over the age of 45 (7/8).   Two of 
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these studies investigated changed eligibility requirements [43-44], 4 investigated benefit generosity 
[35-37, 49] and 2 investigated both [34, 46].  
 
Of the four papers that investigated changes in the CPP/QPP  eligibility requirements, one of these 
found that there was no association between increased rejection rates (indicating more stringent 
assessment criteria) and labour market participation[44]. Two studies found that some periods of 
relaxed eligibility were significantly associated with an increase in labour market participation, whilst 
others had no significant effect. The fourth study found that a relaxation of eligibility criteria, that 
allowed assessors to take into account local labour market conditions in deciding on 
elligibilityeligibility,  was significantly associated with a decrease in employment [43].   
 
Of the six Canadian papers that investigated the effect of differences in benefit replacement rates or 
benefit levels, four reported that higher benefit levels or replacement rates during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s were associated with lower male employment [34-37] . These studies did not 
control for education level [34, 36]  and health status [35, 37]. One of these studies concluded that 
although the level of disability benefits did discourage labour force participation, the disincentive 
effects of low wages had a much greater effect  [36]. Two studies found that changes in benefit 
levels had no significant effect [46, 49]. One of these investigated changes that occurred to benefit 
levels in 1973 [49] and the other investigated the effect of changes in replacement rates between 
1983 and 1997 [46].  This second study found that the effect of changing replacement rates on 
women was in the opposite direction to that hypothesised by the study:  higher replacements rates 
were associated with higher levels of female labour market participation (p=0.052).  
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Table 3.  Studies investigating policy changes and differences between jurisdictions in Canada 
Author Population Study type Description of policy under 
analysis 
Result – regression coefficient (p-value) Comments VA  
Campolieti 
(2004)[49] 
Men aged 45-
64 
Differences in 
differences with 
individual data 
1973 policy change increasing 
QPP benefits by $50(CAD) a 
month.  
Linear regression of policy change on non-
employment.  
45-64year olds: 0.008 (p=0.3) 
45-59 year olds: 0.001 (p=0.48) 
The authors concluded that all the difference-in-difference estimates 
suggested that the disincentive effects associated with disability 
benefits would be economically small and not statistically significant 
at that time. No control for health status or labour market conditions.  
13 
Campolieti and 
Goldenberg, 
(2007)[44] 
Men and 
Women 45-64 
years old 
Differences in 
differences with 
individual data 
Changes in the eligibility and 
medical screening criteria 
occurring in mid 1990s and 
differences between QPP and 
CPP and between CPP regions.  
Linear regression of benefit rejection rates on non-
participation 
Men 0.646 (p=0.166)  
Women 0.02 (p=0.297) 
The authors concluded that they did not find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between denial rates and the labour force non-
participation of older men and women.  Health status not sufficiently 
controlled. 
13 
Harkness (1993) 
[36] 
Prime aged 
men with self 
reported 
disability  
Cross-sectional 
survey  
Level of expected disability 
pension (combination of CPP, 
WCB, private insurance  
payments) 
Logistic Regression of benefit level on labour force 
participation 
-0.00019  (p=0.006) 
Elasticity=- 2.03 
The authors concluded that disability benefits did discourage work, 
but the disincentive effects of low wages were greater. Level of 
education not controlled.  
11 
Gruber (2000)[35] Men 45-59 Differences in 
differences with 
individual data 
1987 increase in the CPP benefit 
level to bring it to the level of the 
QPP  
Logistic regression of  policy and replacement rate on 
non-labour market participation in two separate 
models 
Policy change= 0.15  (OR=1.16)(p=0.02) 
Replacement rate: 1.344 (OR=3.8) (p=0.009) 
Elasticity  = 0.28 
The authors concluded that both models showed a significant effect of 
increases in benefit levels and the replacement rate in reducing labour 
market participation. Health status not controlled.  
11 
Campolieti, 
(2003)[43] 
Men  aged 45-
65 
Differences in 
differences with 
individual data 
1989 change in CPP eligibility 
requirmentsrequirements 
permitting the use of 
socioeconomic conditions 
(e.ge.g. regional unemployment) 
in assessing eligibility for 
disability benefits 
Linear regression on labour market participation 
0.015 (p=0.016) 
The authors concluded that  thethat the relaxation in eligibility 
requirements reduced the labour supply of older men in Canada by 
1.5%. Health status, wages and benefit levels not controlled.  
11 
Campolieti, (2001b) 
[46] 
Men and 
Women 45-65 
Differences in 
differences with 
ecological data 
1. Average replacement rate 
between 1983 and 1997 
2.Relaxed2. Relaxed CPP 
eligibility criteria between 1987 
and 1994 
3. Relaxed QPP eligibility 
between 1993 and 1997 
4. QPP early retirement provision 
 
Linear regression on labour force participation 
Men                                                                                          
1:Men: - 0.2450 (p=0.9),Women: 0.1341 (p=0.052) 
2: Men: 0.0251(p=0.04), Women: -0.0088 (p=0.9)  
3: Men: -0.0082 (p=0.2), Women:  0.0142 (p=0.02)  
4: Men: -0.0478 (p<0.001), Women:  0.0008 (p=0.4) 
 
The authors concluded that some of these estimates did not support 
the hypothesis that looser eligibility rules decrease participation rates 
since they were not statistically significant or did not have the 
expected sign. The change in replacement rate was not significant for 
men in the full model. Increasing replacement rates were associated 
with increased employment in women in the full model, although this 
was not significant.  Education level was not controlled for in the 
models and the health status control was inadequate.  
 
10 
Campolieti(2001)[34
] 
45-64 year old 
men 
Differences in 
differences with 
ecological data 
1. Replacement rate of C/QPP 
benefits 
2. Period of relaxed eligibility in 
CPP (1987-1994).  
Linear regression on labour force participation 
1: -0.2171 ( p=0.004) 
2: 0.0149 (p=0.004) 
The relaxed eligibility requirements in the CPP disability program did 
not have the expected sign in any of the regressions. The replacement 
rate was significantly associated with a decline in participation rates. 
However, these coefficient estimates were smaller and not statistically 
significant when the year specific effects were used instead of the 
linear time trend. Education level was not controlled for in the models 
and the health status control (regional mortality rate) was inadequate. 
9 
Maki (1993) [37] 45-65 year old 
Men 
Time series 
ecological 
1.Average1. Average monthly 
benefit payments in QPP/CPP as 
a ratio with wages 
2. Difference between QPP and 
Linear regression on labour market participation 
1: -0.2 (p<0.001) 
2 :0.102 (p<0.001) 
 
The authors concluded that higher rates of benefits were significantly 
associated with lower employment.  Health status and education level 
not controlled. 
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Studies investigating UK policy changes 
Five studies of UK benefit policy change were reviewed (Table 3). Two of the studies used the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to assess the impact of the 1995 Incapacity to Work Act (IWA) [47-
48]. This policy included a reduction in the level of benefits paid, particularly for older age groups, 
and a tightening of eligibility requirements.  Disney et al (2003) did not detect a significant effect 
from the reforms on the employment of older men with poor health [48]. In contrast, Clasen et al 
(2006) concluded that the reforms made transitions from inactivity into employment more likely for 
25-49 year old men and reduced the flow of older men (aged 50-64) from employment into long 
term sickness. Neither of these studies controlled for changes in wage levels and Clasen et al (2006) 
did not control for changes in health status.   
 
Two studies used aggregate time series data to investigate the effect, on labour market 
participation,  of changes in benefit levels and replacement rates between the early 1980s and the 
end of the 1990s [39] [40].  Benefit levels had been increasing up to the 1995 reform, which then 
decreased the benefits paid to older workers considerably. They find that replacement rates[39] and 
benefit levels[40] were negatively associated with labour force participation.  However, neither 
study controlled for health status and labour market conditions. When separate age trends were 
included in the model in Bell and Smith’s (2004) paper the overall effect was no longer 
significant[39]. Both studies found that that the negative effect of benefit levels on employment was 
larger for people with no qualifications. Using a model that did not include replacement rates, Faggio 
and Nickell (2005) found significant negative effects on labour market participation resulting from 
falls in regional wages in low level occupations in relation to national wage levels.  
 
Another UK study analysed aggregate data from 1979 to 1984 and found that higher average 
replacement rates were associated with increasing numbers of people receiving benefits[38]. 
However, the model used did not control for health status or labour market conditions.  Given that 
this period in the UK was one of rapidly rising national unemployment, this would need to be taken 
into consideration when interpreting the results.  In aA seperateseparate analysis with using cross 
sectional data they show indicated that unemployment was the dominant factors influencing 
disability benefit receipt, with higher unemployment levels in an area associated with higher 
disability benefit receipt.  
 
 
 
Commented [SPC1] : Not sure you need the initials as you never 
refer to it again! 
Commented [SPC2] : Should this be onto long term sickness 
benefits – it’s not making them sick as such is it?  
Commented [SPC3] : This is a bit confusing – did it decrease the 
benefit level only for older groups or for everyone but the decrease 
was more significant for older groups?  
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Table 4 Studies from the UK on benefit changes 
Author Population Study type Description of policy under analysis Result – regression coefficient (p-value) Comments VA  
Disney,R, 
Emmerson,C 
Wakefield, 
M[48] 
50-64 year 
olds 
Interrupted times 
series with panel 
data 
The introduction of the Incapacity to work Act in 
1995 replacing invalidity benefits (IVB) with 
Incapacity Benefit (IB). IB was not available to people 
over state pension age, Eligibility conditions were 
tightened, those claiming IB no longer received an 
additional pension, based on earnings history, this 
meant that benefit level for older workers reduced 
by about 37%. 
Fixed effects logistic regression of policy change on 
employment  
0.10 (OR 1.11) (p=0.3) 
 
 
The authors concluded that the weak results 
may reflect either a weak, or indeed no, 
relationship between the policy change and 
employment. Did not control for changes in 
wages 
13 
Clasen 
J;Davidson 
J;Granssmann 
H;Mauer 
A;[47] 
men 25-64 
year old 
Interrupted times 
series with panel 
data 
Introduction of Incapacity for Wwork Aact (IWA) 
1995, which tightened eligibility criteria and had 
effect of reducing benefit level for older workers. 
Hazard model of transitions, model coefficients and exact p 
values not reported. 
 -25-49 year olds  
Employment  long term sick: No significant  effect 
Inactivity employment : Positive effect (p<0.1) 
Unemployment long term sick: No significant effect  
-50-64  year olds 
Employment long term sick: Negative effect (p <0.1) 
Inactivityemployment, No effect. 
Unemployment Long term sick: Positive effect (p<0.1) 
The authors concluded that the IWA made 
transitions from inactivity into employment 
more likely for 25-49 year olds. Amongst older 
workers the IWA decreased flow from 
employment into long term sick.  However they 
also found IWA increased flow from 
unemployment into long term sickness, 
therefore the IWA didn't contribute to overall 
decrease in movements onto IB. Health status 
and wages were not controlled for in the 
analysis.  
12 
Faggio, G; 
Nickell, S[40] 
Men age 25-
54 
Difference in 
differences study 
with ecological 
data 
Weekly benefit rate (IB/IVB) paid to long term sick or 
disabled with contributory benefit entitlements 
between 1982 to and 1999. 
Linear regression of the log of the rate of benefits and 
wages on non-employment 
All: 0.037 (p=0.009) 
Low education: 0.089 (p=<0.001) 
 
The authors concluded the level of incapacity 
benefits was positively associated with male 
inactivity and a much bigger impact was 
observed for those without qualifications. They 
find much larger effects associated with low 
regional wages. Health status and labour market 
conditions not controlled.  
10 
Disney R;Webb 
S[38] 
Men 18-69 Interrupted time 
series with 
ecological data 
And cross 
sectional analysis 
Average replacement rate from invalidity benefits 
between1979 and -1984. The real value of benefits 
increased had been increasing during this timeover 
this period. .  
Linear regression of replacement rate  (benefits/wages) on 
probability of IVB receipt  
0.292 (p<0.001) 
 
Also include a cross-sectional analysis of various factors on 
employment, but this does not include disability benefits as 
a independent variable  
The authors concluded that the trend in IVB 
receipt was explained by the ageing of the 
workforce, changes in the replacement rate, in 
the health status of the workforce and in income 
and housing tenure. However the dominant 
variable was unemployment. They did not 
control for health status, education or labour 
market conditions in . in the time series analysis.  
9 
Brian Bell and 
James 
Smith;[39] 
25-59 year 
old Men 
Time series study 
with ecological 
data 
Change in value of benefits between 1984 and 2001 
resulting from increasing benefit level s prior to the 
introduction of the IWA in 1995 and a drop in benefit 
levels for some age groups following the IWA.  
 
Regression of  benefit level on labour force non-
participation  
Elasticity=0.26 (p=0.002), however controlling for separate 
age trends reduced the coefficient and it became not 
significant. 
The authors concluded that there was a sizable 
effect on male labour market participation of 
changes in benefit levels.  This was particularly 
the case for the least educated men.  Did not 
control for wages, health status or labour 
market conditions. 
7 
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 Studies investigating Swedish policy changes.  
Two studies from SwedenSweden [41, 45] investigated changes in sickness and disability insurance 
policies. Hesselius and Persson (2007) used longitudinal (panel) data to investigate the effects on 
long-term sickness absence of a 1998 reform to the Swedish national sickness insurance scheme. 
This allowed for additional compensation from collective insurance schemes to be paid on top of 
national sickness insurance payments after 90 days of sickness absence. They found that for people 
on long term sickness absence, this reform was associated with an average increase in the duration 
of sickness absence of 4.7 days (2%)  [41]. In the second study, Karlström et al (2008) used 
longitudinal data to investigate a 1997 change in the Swedish disability insurance scheme that 
abolished favourable treatment for people aged over 60. It required applicants to change occupation 
or residence to find a suitable job, to undertake a more stringent medical test and to engage in 
rehabilitation. The study did not detect any effect from the reform on the employment of older men 
(aged 60-64)[45].  They did find, however, that the reform was associated with a decrease in 
transition from unemployment insurance to disability insurance, a higher transition from 
employment to sickness insurance, a lower transition from sickness insurance to disability insurance 
and increased persistence in sickness insurance. In other words, the reform resulted in people 
shifting between benefits and did not appear to result in increased employment.  These two studies 
were rated through the validity assessment as having the most robust data and analytical 
approaches. 
 
Studies investigating policy changes in Norway.  
One study from Norway was included in the review (Bowitz, 1997).  This investigated the effect of 
changes in the replacement rate in the Norwegian disability insurance scheme between 1971 and 
1991. Over this period, average replacement rates rose in the late 1970s and were unchanged or 
declined slightly during the 1980s[42]. The study found no significant relationship between the 
replacement rate and the numbers of people claiming disability benefits. It concluded that 
increasing unemployment was more important than increasing benefit levels in explaining rising 
entry rates into disability benefits during this time period.  
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Table 5. Studies on Swedish and Norwegian policy changes 
Author Populatio
n 
Study type Description of policy under 
analysis 
Result – regression 
coefficient (p-value) 
Comments VA  
SWEDEN       
Patrik Hesselius and Malin 
Persson[41] 
All 
individuals 
with 
sickness 
absence 
spells of at 
least 91 
days 
Differences in 
Differences 
approach using 
panel data to 
compare blue 
collar workers with 
government 
workers who were 
not affected by 
policy change 
A 1998 policy change in the  
national sickness insurance 
programme that allowed blue 
collar workers and municipal 
workers to claim an additional 
10% of wages through 
compensation from collective 
agreements on top of the 
national insurance payments, 
after 90 days of sickness 
absence.  Previously additional 
payments were deducted from 
national insurance.   
Linear regression of policy 
change on duration of 
sickness absence.  
 
4.66 days (p=0.001) 
The authors concluded that this policy resulted in an increase in the duration 
of sickness absence, in this population by an average of 4.7 days. No 
corresponding effect was found prior to the 91st day or after the 360th day 
in sickness absence. Health, education or occupation not controlled in the 
analysis  
14 
Karlström,Anders ; 
Palme,Mårten; 
Svensson,Ingemar[45] 
Male 
workers 
aged 60-
64. 
Differences in 
differences 
approach using 
panel data to 
compare effect of 
reforms on 60-64 
year olds to 55-59 
year olds 
1997 policy change in the 
Swedish Disability Insurance 
scheme, which abolished 
favourable treatment for over 60 
year olds including requirement 
to change occupation/ residence 
to find suitable job, a more 
stringent medical test and the 
requirement to engage n 
rehabilitation.    
OLS regression of various 
transitions in and out of 
employment 
 
Employmentnon-
employment 
 -0.0074 (p>0.1) 
 
All statesDisability 
Insurance 
 -0.0104 (p >0.1)  
non-employment non-
employment 0.01(p<0.05) 
The authors concluded that it was not possible to detect any effect on 
employment from the reform. There did however appear to be an 
anticipation effect, in that there was an increased flow into disability 
insurance when the reform was announced. This was 2 years before the 
reform was actually implemented.   
 
They did however find that the reform was associated with a decrease in 
transition from unemployment insurance to disability insurance and , higher 
transition from employment  to Sickness insurance and lower transition from 
Sickness insurance to Disability insurance as well as increased persistence in 
Sickness insurance. In other words the reform resulted in people shifting 
between benefit systems and not into the labour market.  Level of disability, 
wages and benefit level were not controlled for in the analysis  
14 
NORWAY       
Bowitz E[42] Men and 
women 
16-66 
A time series 
approach using 
ecological data 
Changes in the replacement rate 
in the Norwegian  disability 
insurance scheme between 
1971-1991. Average replacement 
rates rose in the late 1970s and 
were unchanged or declined 
slightly during the 1980s 
An error correction 
weighted linear regression 
analysing the effect of the 
replacement rate on the 
probability of entry into 
disability benefits.  
 
0.17 (p=0.16) 
The authors concluded that unemployment was important in explaining 
rising entry rates into disability benefit, but that there was less evidence for 
the effect of increases in the replacement rate.  No control for health status 
or educational level. 
9 
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 Discussion 
Our review sought to identify the evidence available from 5 OCED countries with highly developed 
social welfare systems, to determine the extent to which the generosity and eligibility requirements 
of disability benefit programmes affect labour market participation.   
 
There was no clear evidence from these countries that changes in the eligibility requirements of 
disability benefits had a measurable impact on employment. Of the 5 studies that specifically 
addressed this issue, 1 from Canada found that relaxing eligibility was significantly associated with a 
decline in employment of older men[43], 2 papers from Canada found that some periods of relaxed 
eligibility were associated with a significant  increase in employment[34, 46] and 2 papers from 
Canada[44] and Sweden[45] found no significant effect; importantly this included the Swedish paper 
that was rated as having the highest level of validity. Two papers from the UK assessed the impact of 
the Incapacity for Work Act which involved both a reduction in benefit levels and a tightening of 
assessment approach. These studies  gave a mixed picture, one study demonstrated improved 
employment outcomes[47], whilst the other did not detect any effect[48].  Therefore we conclude 
that there is insufficient evidence to indicate whether changes in benefit eligibility requirements 
similar to those studied here will have an impact on the employment of people with disabilities and 
chronic Illness in well developed welfare states.   
 
Of the 11 studies that investigated whether the generosity of disability benefits influenced labour 
market participation, 8 reported that benefit levels or benefit replacement rates had a significant 
negative association with measures of labour market participation [34-41]. Only one of these studies 
investigated the effect of benefit levels separately on the employment of women and this found no 
significant effect[46], the others only included men or were on mixed populations. These studies all 
have substantial validity issues, which we discuss in more detail below.  The Swedish study that was 
assessed as being the most robust did however demonstrate a small but significant effect with an 
increase in benefit of up to 10% associated with a  2%  increase in the duration of long term sickness 
[41]. Whilst several of the other studies in this review report much larger effects, there is some 
likelihood that the size and significance of these effects are attributable to other confounding factors 
and inappropriate statistical methods. We therefore conclude that whilst it is likely that at some 
level increased benefit generosity will  reduce labour market participation, and that the majority of 
evidence reviewed here points in that direction, there is insufficient evidence of a high enough 
quality to determine the extent of that effect.  
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 Limitations of the available evidence  
All of these studies rely on “natural policy experiments”, arising from governments changing 
disability benefit schemes over time, or when schemes were administered differently in different 
jurisdictions as in Canada. As with other observational studies, we need first to assess whether the 
size of the effects observed could be attributable to confounding factors or could have occurred by 
chance. 
 
Conventional economic analysis of welfare systems has been criticised for oversimplifying the 
relationship between participation in the labour market and financial incentives [8]. There are 
numerous interrelated factors that could influence whether a person developing a health problem 
will subsequently remain in or return to employment. To determine whether the reported results 
are actually the result of changes in disability benefits, these other factors need to be taken into 
account either in the study design or in the analysis. Potential confounding factors in these studies 
would include changes in labour market conditions, disability and workplace legislation, 
rehabilitation interventions, as well as differences in individual characteristics such as educational 
level or health status.  However many of the studies reviewed here had not fully taken this context 
into account.  Four out of the 16 studies reviewed did not control for labour market conditions in 
their analysis [35, 39-40, 49].  Seven studies used aggregate (ecological) data in which individual 
characteristics cannot be adequately controlled for [34, 37-40, 42, 46].  Even those studies using 
individual data lacked sufficient controls for important individual confounders: all 16 studies were 
missing controls for one or more of the following variables; educational level, occupation, health 
status or wages.   
 
It is recognised that these confounding issues can be partly overcome by using a “differences in 
differences”  design and through using fixed effects models with  longitudinal  (panel) data[50].  Nine 
of the studies in this review [34-35, 40-41, 43-46, 49] used a difference in difference approach. Four 
of the studies reviewed used longitudinal (panel) data [41, 45, 47-48], and only 2 of used both [41, 
45].  
Fixed effects models will however only control for unobserved individual effects if these do not vary 
over time. Difference in difference designs, where one group has been affected by a policy change 
whilst another has not, will still be susceptible to an imbalance in characteristics between these two 
groups particularly if this results in different trends over time in the outcome.  
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 The statistical techniques used by many of the studies in this review have been criticised widely in 
the econometric literature [51-53].  In particular where they have not taken into account serial and 
spatial correlation in the dependant variable [51-52]. Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that this 
issue could result in difference-in-difference studies reporting a significant effect 45% of the time 
when in fact there is no effect[52].  Nine of the studies in this review, [34-39, 42-43]  had not taken 
one or other of these issues into account and therefore will have under-estimated the standard 
error of the effect. The two studies from Sweden [41, 45] were rated as having the highest validity 
because they were the only studies to use longitudinal (panel) data, a difference in differences 
approach and an appropriate statistical technique. Given the threats to the validity of many of the 
studies in this review conclusions are necessarily limited and indicate that there is a lack of evidence 
of a high enough quality to indicate the extent to which these policies will increase labour market 
participation of people with chronic illness and disabilities.  
 
Policy implications 
There are various potential reasons why we found no clear evidence that changes in benefit 
eligibility requirements influenced employment. This may have resulted from the methodological 
issues discussed but it is also possible that there is actually no effect from these policies. One 
possible reason for a lack of effect, suggested by some papers in this review, is that changes in the 
eligibility structure for one benefit may result in movement into other benefit schemes rather than 
into the labour marketmarket [45, 47]. For example Karlstrom and Palme (2008) show that changes 
in the assessment requirements for disability benefits in Sweden resulted in increased persistence of 
people on sickness and unemployment benefits , but no increase in employment[45].  This indicates 
that changes to disability benefits need to be coordinated with developments in other welfare 
benefit schemes. The aim should be to increase employment rather just reducing the number of 
people on benefits.  
 
Whilst we did not find sufficient evidence of a high enough quality to indicate the extent to which 
changes in benefit generosity affect employment, several studies indicated that wage levels and the 
level of unemployment, are potentially more important influences on the employment of people 
with disabilities. Three of the studies from the UK and Canada report that the low wages of jobs 
available was a more important predictor of decreased employment than the level of disability 
benefits [36, 39-40].  The level of unemployment at a regional and national level is also recognised as 
an important determinant of the numbers of people on disability benefits in two papers from the UK 
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and Norway [38, 42], with higher numbers on disability benefits associated with higher levels of 
unemployment.   
 
The relationship between the level of wages and the structure of the disability benefit system in a 
country has important implications for work incentives and the differential effect of benefit levels on 
different socioeconomic groups.  Norway, Denmark and Sweden are characterised by high minimum 
wages and generous disability benefits.   High minimum wages in these countries may give strong 
incentives to work particularly for people with low social status, overriding the disincentive effects of 
high benefits.  In Norway and Sweden benefit levels are dependent on previous earnings; this means 
that replacement rates (i.e the proportion of wages that would be replaced by benefits) are at a 
similar level for people on low wages as for those on higher wages. In countries with flat rate 
benefits such as the UK, Denmark and to a lesser extent Canada, the replacement rate will be higher 
for low wage earners than for higher earners.  The disincentive effects of disability benefits are 
therefore likely to be greater for less skilled socioeconomic groups in those countries with flat rate 
benefits, particularly if wage levels for unskilled labour are also low.  This may explain why two of 
the studies from the UK found that the negative effect of benefit levels on employment was larger 
for people with no qualifications[39-40].  
 
In all five countries included in this review the employment rates of people with a chronic illness or 
disability decrease steeply with decreasing socioeconomic status  [6-7]. The evidence presented here 
suggests that a combination of low wages for unskilled labour, high unemployment in disadvantaged 
areas and flat-rate disability benefits is likely to exacerbate this level of inequality.  Interventions 
which may be influential would include those which increase the number of jobs that are accessible 
to people with disabilities and increase their wages either through subsidies or minimum wage 
legislation.  
 
Before policy makers consider lowering and/or restricting access to disability benefits, on the 
assumption that it will increase employment amongst people with disabilities, they need to weigh up 
the potential benefits that may result from this policy, against its potential negative consequences. 
This review demonstrates that there is lack of high quality evidence of the extent to which reducing 
benefit levels will increase employment in countries with well developed welfare states. The level of 
gain from reducing benefits is largely unknown. The negative consequences have also not been 
assessed, but would potentially include increased poverty for people who already have health 
problems, possibly exacerbating health inequalities. Whilst changing benefit levels may affect the 
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employment of some claimants at the margins, the consequences of this, in terms of loss of income, 
affects all claimants. If the employment effects are found to be small and leave more vulnerable 
groups such as people with mental health problems on reduced benefits, the negative consequences 
may outweigh the gains made in increasing employment.  
Future evaluations of these policies need to determine the extent to which they impact, not only on 
the employment of people with chronic illness and disabilities, but also on their income, social 
inclusion and health, as well as any differential impact across health conditions and social groups.  
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Appendix 1. Major disability benefit changes in countries included in study 
Country  Major Reforms of Disability Benefits 
Canada 1973- Benefits in the QPP programme increased by $50(CAD).[49] 
1984 -QPP introduced early retirement option.[49] 
1987- CPP doubled the value of the flat-rate component of the benefit to a level equal to 
that paid by the QPP, relaxed the contributory eligibility rule and introduced early 
retirement option. [34, 46, 54] 
1989 – CPP policy directive allowing non medical factors such as the regional unemployment 
rate to be taken into account when assessing claims[54] 
1992- CPP allowed for retrospective claims for benefits to be determined  some time after 
the date of onset of disability  
1993- QPP changed their requirement for being unable to work from “any job” to “usual 
job” and relaxed contribution requirements 
1995- A more stringent set of medical adjudication guidelines adopted in the CPP.  
1995-A reversal of previous policy in the CPP allowing non medical factors such as the 
regional unemployment rate to be taken into account when assessing claims.  
1995 –CPP Expands work test requirements to include 55-64 year olds.  
1998-CPP changes contribution requirements and increases number of years of earnings 
used to calculate earnings related portion of benefit.  
UK 1971 – Invalidity Pension and Invalidity Allowance (together known as Invalidity Benefits 
(IVB) contribution-based, income-replacement benefit introduced. 
1975 – Introduction of Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP) at lower rate than IVB 
(housewives ineligible) 
1984 – NCIP replaced with Severe Disablement Allowance. 
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1980- Invalidity Benefits linked to prices rather than being up-rated with earnings as they 
had been previously. 
1986 – Income Support replaces Supplementary Benefit and includes extra cost Disability 
Premium[55] 
1995- Incapacity for Work Act replaces IVB with Incapacity Benefit (IB). IB was not available 
to people over state pension age, eligibility conditions were tighter, those claiming IB no 
longer received an additional pension based on earnings history, as a result the benefit level 
for older workers reduced by about 37%[39] 
1999- Contribution conditions modified, additional information required on ability to work, 
income from private pensions taken into account in assessing amount of benefit to be paid 
out.  
2001 –Severe Disablement Allowance closed to new claims. 
2008- Welfare Reform Act replaces IB with Employment Support Allowance for new 
claimants, this includes a more stringent work capability assessment and two-tier benefit 
with those deemed to be capable of work related activity will receive lower benefits than 
those judged unable to work conditional upon them undertaking work-related activity. [56] 
Sweden 1987-Increase in sickness benefit replacement rate to 90% of earnings for all claims 
1991-Reduction in sickness benefit level to 75% in the first three days. 
1992 -Reduction in sickness benefit level to 80% after day 90. 
1993- Reduction in sickness benefit level to 70% after the first year. 
Second half of the 1990s compensation rates increased again, offering 90% until the end of 
the first year and 80% thereafter. 
1995-Tougher rules for sickness certification introduced 
1997- Policy change in the disability insurance scheme, which abolished favourable 
treatment for over 60 year olds, introducing the requirement to change occupation or 
residence to find suitable job as well as a more stringent medical test and the requirement 
to engage n rehabilitation.    
1998 - A policy change in the sickness insurance programme that allowed blue collar 
workers and municipal workers to claim an additional 10% of wages through compensation 
from collective agreements on top of the national insurance payments, after 90 days of 
sickness absence. 
2003 Sickness and disability benefits merged: claimants aged under-30 receive ‘activity 
compensation’ only paid for a maximum of three years, over-30s receive ‘sickness 
compensation’ that can be permanent  
2007- New guidelines introduced for granting sick leave certificates by GPs 
2008- Reduction in sickness benefit to 80% of prior earnings for the first year, 75% for the 
second year payable for a maximum of 550 days.  [5, 45, 57-59] 
Norway 1988 the introduction of a medical Certificate system at 8 weeks of sickness absence.[60] 
1993 Second medical reassessment introduced at 12 weeks   
1970’s-1980’s-On average, replacement rates rose in the late 1970s and were unchanged or 
declined slightly during the 1980s.[28] 
1991- Eligibility criteria tightened  and level of benefit reduced [60-61] 
1998- Minimum pension increased by 10%, age limit raised from 16 to 18 years old medical 
requirements sharpened for young disabled[62] 
2000- Requirement for having gone through rehabilitation increased[62] 
2004- Introduction of temporary disability benefit, and stricter evaluation of the functional 
capacity of the people on sick leave, including sanctions on GPs who do not comply with the 
new rules.   
Denmark Prior to 2003- Disability benefit level depended degree of disability, family status and age. 
2003 - A new disability pension scheme consolidated this scheme into one benefit payable 
at a flat rate which is around half of the gross average wage.  The partial benefit for partial 
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disability was abolished altogether. The reform also included a change in the assessment 
criterion so that a person is now assessed as to whether they can support themselves 
through any work including a subsidised flex-job.  
2005 - New medical certificates for sickness certification were introduced with a focus on 
the person’s ability to function (certificates remain non-statutory)[63].  
 
Appendix 2: Databases searched 
1. British Humanities index BHI 
2. MEDLINE 
3. Scopus Business and Economics 
4. Scopus natural sciences 
5. Sociological Abstracts 
6. International Bibliography of the Social Sciences 
7. Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects 
8. Cochrane database for systematic reviews 
9. Social Sciences Index 
10. Proquest dissertations and thesis 
11. Econpapers 
12. System for Information on Grey Literature in Europe Archive 
13. Web of Science 
Websites 
1. International Labour Organisations 
2. OECD 
3. Department for work and Pensions 
4. Her Majesties Revenue and Customs 
5. Institute for Fiscal Studies 
6. National Institute for Economic and Social Research.  
7. The Institute for Employment Research.  
8. Centre for Economic Policy Research  
9. Danish National Centre for Social Research. 
10. Stockholm University's Department of Economics Working papers. 
11. Sweden's National Institute of Economic Research. 
12. The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 
Appendix 3.  
Validity Assessment  
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Criteria Rationale Score 
Unit of 
analysis 
First, whether the unit of analysis was aggregate 
(ecological), individual or repeated measures on 
the same individuals (panel). Panel data was seen 
as being the most robust as it allows for 
unmeasured confounding factors to be accounted 
for where these do not vary within individuals 
over time. Ecological studies were seen at the 
least robust  as ecological bias can occur where 
aggregate data are used to make inferences about 
individuals.[64]  Second, in terms of the 
comparison approach used in the analysis. 
3- Longitudinal (panel) data 
2-Individual data 
1-Ecological (aggregate data) 
Comparison 
approach 
Studies either compared cross sectional 
differences in disability benefits, changes over 
time or a combination of both using a difference in 
differences approach. Cross sectional comparisons 
will be particularly susceptible to unmeasured 
sources of confounding. Studies that look at 
changes in the same group over time will 
overcome this to a certain extent; however the 
results will be at risk of being influenced by other 
secular trends.  The most robust approach will be 
where a policy has changed over time for one 
group and this is compared with another group 
that is unaffected by the change (a difference in 
differences approach). 
3-Difference in Differences 
2-Interupted time series 
3-Cross sectional 
Selection 
and 
response 
bias 
Assessment of the level of selection and response 
bias, based on information reported on data 
sources. No studies reported response rates or 
formally assessed response or selection bias. Most 
studies used recognised national surveys.  
3- Random sample/ Nationally 
recognised survey 
2-Non random sample but 
evidence that it is comparable 
1- Non random sample from 
administrative system of 
programs without universal 
coverage.  
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Confounding Whether potential confounders were adequately 
adjusted for in the analysis (Age, Sex, Health 
status, Labour market conditions, wage, education 
or occupation. 
3- All major confounders 
included in analysis 
2-Missing <3 confounders 
1-missing >2 confounders 
Analysis The likelihood of the analysis resulting in biased 
estimates was assessed.  This included looking at 
the sample size and whether an appropriate 
statistical technique had been used. In particular 
several studies had not adequately adjusted for 
the spatial clustering and serial correlation in the 
data. Often multiple model specifications are 
presented each with different sets of covariates 
without a systematic approach to identify the 
most appropriate covariates to include in the final 
model [65].  
3- large sample size and an 
appropriate statistical 
technique was used 
2-Either an inappropriate 
statistical technique was used 
or the sample size was small. 
3.-Both an inappropriate 
statistical technique was used 
and the sample was small.   
 
 
Appendix 4.  Summary of search stategy 
Policy (change/difference/reform/eligib*/uneligib*/qualify*/entitl*/generosity/screen*/ 
condition*  AND /benefit*/insurance/income replacement/pension*/ 
compensation/welfare/social security), 
Population (sickness/disab*/chronic/injur*/accident/illness/) 
Outcome Labour/labor /work/force/involve*/participat*/unemployment/employment). 
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 Figure 1 Flow chart for searches and study selection 
A full search strategy is available from the author’s on request 
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